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Technology Assessment in the 
USA: Distributed Institutional 
Governance
by Jathan Sadowski and David H. Guston, 
Arizona State University
In the US, there is a lack of a centralized tech-
nology assessment (TA) capacity, which effec-
tively moves the US back in time, pre-Office of 
Technology Assessment, when TA functions 
existed but were so decentralized and varied 
that they were hardly recognized as such. 
There is no primary organization, public or pri-
vate, to innovate new methods, establish best 
practices, or provide policy guidance. Instead, 
there are disparate organizations, the connec-
tions among which cannot even be called a 
network. This article will describe three dis-
crete – but at times overlapping, interacting, 
and complementary – institutional settings 
where activities one could recognize as TA are 
occurring: government agencies, non-govern-
mental organizations, and academic research 
centers. The paper will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the challenges and roadblocks 
to institutionalized TA in the US.
1 Introduction
When one thinks of institutionalized technolo-
gy assessment (TA), whether in the context of 
the United States or elsewhere, one invariably 
calls to mind the Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA). In service to the US Congress, OTA 
was the first and largest “parliamentary” TA of-
fice. Scholars, journalists, and participants have 
often written on its history and methods (see 
Bimber 1996; Guston 2003; Hill 1997; Keiper 
2004; Kunkle 1995) – and for good reason, since 
it marks an important, and still unique, experi-
ment in TA. OTA’s origins reach back to the early 
1960s1 when tensions flared between the execu-
tive and the congressional branches of the federal 
government about access to technical and scien-
tific advice (Bimber/Guston 1995). After much 
debate in Congress about what methods and 
styles of advice legislators needed at their dispos-
al, the Technology Assessment Act, which would 
establish OTA, eventually passed and President 
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clude with a brief discussion of the challenges 
and roadblocks to institutionalized TA in the US.
2 Government Agencies
Even without OTA, the US government gets TA 
through other means. We will largely focus on 
the ways TA emanates from the federal tier be-
fore pointing to TA at the state level.
After OTA shut down, Congress shifted 
responsibility for conducting officially sanc-
tioned TA to the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO), at first as a pilot program and then, 
starting in 2008, as a permanent function. GAO 
was initially established in 1921 as the Gener-
al Accounting Office until a 2004 legislative 
act changed its name. Observers often referred 
to GAO as the “congressional watchdog” for 
its audits and investigations of how the federal 
government spends public money. Part of GAO’s 
mission, however, overlaps with that of parlia-
mentary TA, to “provide Congress with timely 
information that is objective, fact-based, nonpar-
tisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced”.3
Similarly, the agency’s own broad definition 
of TA matches the spirit of the overarching goals 
of other TA organizations: “the thorough and bal-
anced analysis of significant primary, indirect, and 
delayed interactions of a technological innovation 
with society, the environment, and the economy 
and the present and foreseen consequences and 
impacts of those interactions”.4 While this aim 
is laudable, and individual TA reports issued by 
GAO have been well-received, the TA function 
there has not come close to being able to replace 
OTA’s organizational capacity and leadership. 
GAO’s TA function – which has produced only 
seven reports since 2002 – is somewhat lost with-
in a larger, non-technical organization.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rep-
resents another increasingly TA-like function, 
this time from the executive branch of US gov-
ernment. While it does not have an official man-
date for TA – its mission is to “protect consum-
ers” and “promote competition” – FTC has, over 
the past fifteen years, been on the frontlines of 
analyzing and policing issues related to informa-
tion privacy and the data economy. FTC holds 
workshops and writes in-depth reports on these 
Richard Nixon signed it into law in 1972. After 
a largely productive – if sometimes controversial 
and tumultuous – lifespan, OTA eventually be-
came the victim of widespread budget cuts. In 
1995, the lights went out on OTA.
Socio-technically minded academics and 
policy-makers often speak with a fond nostalgia 
for OTA. There are periodically public calls to 
refund the organization. Representative Rush 
Holt, a Democratic member of Congress from 
New Jersey who also has a PhD in physics, ar-
gued in the popular technology magazine Wired 
for “reversing the congressional science loboto-
my” – that is, the defunding of OTA – “by restor-
ing a once robust science resource to its rightful 
place” (Holt 2009).2
At the time of this article’s publication, 
however, OTA will have been defunct for near-
ly as long as it was operational. In these inter-
im years, things have changed: For one, the po-
litical climate in the US is stormier than it was 
during OTA’s existence. The aggressive partisan 
divide in the contemporary Congress means ev-
erything has become a battleground for ideolog-
ical contention, and technoscientific issues have 
not escaped appropriation by some partisans to 
accentuate or even define that divide. OTA had 
frequently come under fire by some Republicans, 
who accused it of being a tool for the Democratic 
Party (Keiper 2004). Today, there are no pros-
pects for such an institution to serve both houses 
and parties in Congress until there are significant 
shifts in the political dialogue.
The lack of a centralized TA capacity moves 
the US back in time, pre-OTA, when TA functions 
existed but were so decentralized and varied that 
they were hardly recognized as such. There is no 
primary organization, public or private, to inno-
vate new methods, establish best practices, or 
provide policy guidance. Instead, there are dispa-
rate organizations, the connections among which 
cannot even be called a network. The remainder 
of this article will describe three discrete – but at 
times overlapping, interacting, and complemen-
tary – institutional settings where activities one 
could recognize as TA are occurring: government 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
academic research centers. The paper will con-
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issues, which usually receive heavy attention and 
coverage from journalists, academics, and poli-
cy wonks.5 Legal scholars Solove and Hartzog 
(2014, p. 583) find that, “in practice, FTC pri-
vacy jurisprudence has become the broadest and 
most influential regulating force on information 
privacy in the United States – more so than near-
ly any privacy statute or any common law tort”.
In addition to the few federal agencies that 
conduct both de jure and de facto TA, presiden-
tial committees and commissions often provide 
advice to the executive branch through the con-
duct of TA-like activities. For example, in Janu-
ary 2014 the President’s Council of Advisors for 
Science and Technology (PCAST) – a standing 
body advisory to the President and his Office of 
Science and Technology Policy – conducted a 
90-day review of big data and privacy. PCAST 
released the resulting report “Big Data: Seizing 
Opportunities, Preserving Values” to the public, 
which became, according to the White House, 
“part of the foundation for future policies and ac-
tions that will help us stay at the forefront of this 
rapidly evolving sector”.6
There are also presidential commissions that 
are more ad hoc than PCAST, but more stable than 
any one of its studies. Perhaps the most high-pro-
file TA-like commission has been the Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues.7 
This commission releases, on average, biannual 
reports that look at questions related to the ethical 
and social aspects of scientific research and tech-
nological development. Neither as technical nor 
as wonky as traditional TAs, the Bioethics Com-
mission’s reports are much more philosophical in 
their orientation: They sketch out ethical frame-
works, principles, and approaches; they grapple 
with larger political questions related to justice, 
fairness, and democracy; and they consider indi-
vidual rights, dignity, and autonomy.
Even in the absence of OTA, the most 
well-institutionalized governmental TA capac-
ities exist at the federal level. “The technology 
assessment movement that contributed to the 
creation of OTA had only a modest impact in 
the states” (Guston et al. 1997, p. 235), however, 
and while there is some demand in the state leg-
islatures for their own technical information and 
analysis, the supply is short. Part of the problem 
is that tight budgets and limited resources mean 
that state legislators often relegate TA-like func-
tions to staffers – who are already stretched thin 
and likely not experts themselves. This situation 
leaves most states without their own dedicated 
organizations for TA, and state legislators must 
instead rely on whatever forms of distributed 
TA they have access to and trust to give reliable 
analysis – often including not only explicitly 
political organizations like executive agencies 
and lobbyists, but also ostensibly non-political, 
non-governmental organizations like state-level 
academies of science and state universities.
3 Non-governmental Organizations
In addition to official government agencies, 
there are many non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that undertake TA. We will describe and 
provide some examples of three major catego-
ries: think tanks and policy advocacy, quasi-gov-
ernmental organizations, and media platforms.
There are many think tanks and policy advo-
cacy organizations that conduct familiar TA ac-
tivities, e.g., writing research reports, providing 
real-time analysis and commentary via articles, 
blog posts, and press releases, and generating 
policy recommendations directed at political de-
cision makers. Unlike some government agen-
cies like the former OTA or the current GAO that 
strive to be bipartisan and neutral, these organi-
zations have explicit ideological positions with 
regards to what values, interests, and worldviews 
their work supports. Possessing such a worldview 
does not necessarily degrade their TA. One does, 
however, need to be conscious of the choices and 
framings that influence their analyses and conclu-
sions. These NGOs are varied, and enumerating 
an in-depth, ideologically ordered, cross-section 
of them is beyond our current scope – especially 
since their TA functions are usually just one part 
of a larger organization. Some examples include 
the regulatory focus on “Internet and Technology” 
within the right-wing Heritage Foundation and 
the “Open Technology Institute” program within 
the centrist New America Foundation. Recently, 
the Brookings Institution, a left-center think tank, 
released a white paper that made an argument for 
creating what the author called a “Federal Robot-
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An emerging trend of media platforms has 
begun to serve TA-oriented functions. These 
platforms strive to present analyses, arguments, 
and recommendations in a way that a non-spe-
cialized audience can understand and incorporate 
into their lives. Such platforms are still scarce, 
but there are notable vanguards including the 
“Future Tense” program – a partnership between 
the New America Foundation, Slate magazine, 
and Arizona State University – which aims to 
“explore emerging technologies and their trans-
formative effects on society and public policy.”8 
Through a fellowship program, a regular series of 
public events, and a dedicated channel on Slate.
com, Future Tense presents a multi-scalar way 
of spreading its impact. Another example is The 
New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and So-
ciety, an outlet that describes itself as “an effort 
to clarify the nation’s moral and political under-
standing of all areas of technology.”9 Specifically 
targeted at policy-makers and scientists, as well 
as an interested public, The New Atlantis is one 
of a few hybrid outlets that tow the line between 
professional journal and popular magazine. It 
does so by combining elements of academic rig-
or and socio-technical topics with the argumenta-
tive style and lucidity of a political commentary 
magazine. The hope is that such a synthesis hits 
the right balance where technological topics can 
be assessed in a way that has broader political 
and socio-cultural impacts. Platforms like Future 
Tense and The New Atlantis are relatively new, 
so it remains to be seen how effective they actu-
ally turn out to be at providing fresh approaches 
to both the practice and dissemination of TA.
As media platforms, Future Tense and The 
New Atlantis also represent the work of think 
tanks and policy advocacy groups expanding 
their vision and audience beyond traditional, nar-
rowly cast decision makers and toward the edu-
cated public. A group called Expert and Citizen 
Assessment of Science and Technology (ECAST) 
pursues a similar effort, but oriented toward the 
creation of participatory TA (pTA). Rather than 
advocate for a recreated OTA, a group repre-
senting academic research (Arizona State Uni-
versity), science museums (Museum of Science, 
Boston), quasi-governmental organizations (the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol-
ics Agency” (Calo 2014). This proposed agency – 
which would advise lawmakers, file court briefs, 
and fund new research – would serve as a source 
of in-depth knowledge about the social, legal, 
and policy aspects of the broad technical field of 
robotics. While motivations driving these legisla-
tive prescriptions are praiseworthy, white papers 
that take a strong stance on supporting efforts for 
(institutionalized) TA are still rare cases.
Curiously enough, though, a large number of 
NGOs with explicit focus on technology policy 
tend to argue for positions on the civil libertarian 
side of the political spectrum. Influential instances 
are the American Civil Liberties Union’s project 
on “Speech, Privacy and Technology”, the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for De-
mocracy and Technology, and Electronic Privacy 
Information Center. One could speculate about 
reasons for this ideological cluster: Perhaps new 
technologies, especially those related to digital 
information and communications, pose a greater 
– or at least more obvious – actual and potential 
threat to civil liberties than previous technologies 
did; or perhaps articulate, well-positioned, and 
wealthy people advocate for these libertarian pol-
icies that suit both their ideological disposition 
and their interests in these technologies.
While think tanks and policy advocacy orga-
nizations vie for attention in a decentralized TA 
environment, one large, centralized player does 
remain – the quasi-governmental National Acad-
emies complex, composed of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engi-
neering, the Institute of Medicine, and the Nation-
al Research Council. The National Academies’ 
TA capacity – the scope of topics, the process 
for conducting studies, the prolific output (two to 
three hundred reports annually), and the authorita-
tive position – is, perhaps, the closest institutional 
proxy to OTA that exists in the US today – indeed, 
many high-ranking OTA personnel moved to the 
Academies. The National Academies’ wide-rang-
ing TA is unique when compared to other qua-
si-governmental organizations that only focus on 
specific technologies, e.g., the “Project on Emerg-
ing Nanotechnologies” partnership between the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol-
ars and the Pew Charitable Trusts.
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ars), non-governmental organizations (the Loka 
Institute), and citizen science (Science Cheer-
leader and SciStarter) came together in 2010 to 
create ECAST. While marginally institutional-
ized, ECAST has nevertheless spearheaded US 
involvement in the participatory project “World 
Wide Views on Biodiversity”, organized by the 
Danish Board of Technology, and has received 
a cooperative agreement from the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct 
a pTA of NASA’s planned Asteroid Initiative.
4 Academic Research Units
For readers of this journal, perhaps the most 
familiar modes of TA – and the ones they are 
likely most directly contributing to – are those 
stemming from academic research units. These 
university-based organizations grew up around 
the TA-like funding schemes from public and 
private sponsors, which provide the resources 
needed to coordinate and direct research out-
comes. They all operate differently, based, in 
part, on the parameters, goals, and conditions 
inherent to external funding sources. But there is 
a more general family resemblance among these 
organizations that reflects the culture of their 
academic context. Unlike the other institutional 
categories we describe, TA originating from ac-
ademic research is most heavily geared towards 
epistemic contributions, dialogue, and critique, 
with an emphasis on academic publishing, and 
with some organizations undertaking pTAs and/
or writing white papers for industry and pol-
icy-makers. While academic research centers 
are often funded by government agencies (e.g., 
the U.S. National Science Foundation [NSF] or 
U.S. Department of Energy), their forms of TA 
tend to be somewhat more removed from pol-
icy-makers than think tanks and quasi-govern-
mental agencies. Many such activities have been 
spawned by connecting societal research to new 
or emerging science and technology research, 
e.g., the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications 
(ELSI) Research Program attached to the Hu-
man Genome Initiative and the social and eth-
ical implications (SEI) research attached to the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative.
Examples of the latter are the two Centers 
for Nanotechnology in Society, one at Arizona 
State University (CNS-ASU) and the other at 
University of California, Santa Barbara (CNS-
UCSB). NSF funds these centers to conduct a 
variety of academic research, public engage-
ment projects, and informal science education 
initiatives (such as working with science muse-
ums) – many of which revolve around questions 
of governance. Another example is the Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs 
(BCSIA) at Harvard University, which focuses 
on the intersections among science, technolo-
gy, environment, and security. BCSIA advances 
scholarly knowledge and takes an active role in 
providing policy advice to lawmakers, diplo-
mats, and military leaders. A third is the Center 
for Internet and Society at Stanford University, 
which researches information and communica-
tion technology and law, focusing on regulation 
and legal protection for civil liberties, privacy, 
data protection, and network neutrality. While 
lodged in universities, these centers and their 
numerous cognates are not very different from 
their counterpart “think tanks” in NGOs.
5 Conclusion
In the US context, TA comprises a highly distrib-
uted set of organizations, which are at best loose-
ly networked together by a broadly shared and 
overarching function, but distinguished by vary-
ing capacities, methods, values, intentions, and 
goals. On one hand, distributed TA allows for an 
agile, bottom-up style where not one particular 
type of TA necessarily becomes dominant and 
shuts out other alternatives. On the other hand, 
the basic challenge with distributed TA is that 
there is little or no coordination of what subjects 
are studied, how they are analyzed, and how to 
ensure assessments have impact. There are gaps 
and clusters in the distributed TA network. That 
is, we see partial coverage of scholarly issues – 
with clusters around, for example, civil liberties 
like privacy and free speech or bioethical con-
cerns related to research conduct and individual 
harms – and of existing or emerging technologies 
– with clusters around, for example, nanotech-
SCHWERPUNKT
Seite 58 Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 24. Jg., Heft 1, Februar 2015 
Disclosure Statement
Jathan Sadowski previously worked for the “Fu-
ture Tense” partnership between the New Ameri-
ca Foundation, Slate magazine, and Arizona State 
University, and he is a graduate student in CNS-
ASU. Dave Guston is a principal in ECAST, and 
the director of CNS-ASU.
Notes
1) Inouye and Süsskind (1977) argue that OTA’s lin-
eage reaches back, indirectly, to a 1937 government 
report, Technological Trends and National Policy.
2) In-depth assessment of the many lessons to be 
learned from the OTA experience can be found in 
other volumes (e.g., Morgan/Peha 2003).
3) http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (download 
6.8.14).
4) http://www.gao.gov/technology_assessment/key_
reports (download 6.8.14).
5) FTC’s most recent report was released in May 
2014: “Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency 
and Accountability”; http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-
congress-require-data-broker-industry-be-more 
(download 13.11.14).
6) http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology/
big-data-review (download 7.8.14).
7) http://bioethics.gov/about (download 7.8.14).
8) http://futuretense.newamerica.net/ (download 
7.8.14).
9) http://www.thenewatlantis.com/about/ (download 
7.8.14).
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Experiments in Technology 
Assessment for International 
Development: What Are the 
Lessons for Institutionalisation?
by Adrian Ely, University of Sussex, Patrick 
van Zwanenberg, CENIT, and Andrew Stir-
ling, University of Sussex
Several countries across the OECD have a rel-
atively strong history of using technology as-
sessment (TA) to inform science, technology 
and innovation (STI) policies. But many lower 
income, developing countries lack the capa-
bilities and institutions for doing so. Despite 
its more general potential role in this area, TA 
has been used relatively little (in or outside the 
OECD) to inform and challenge investments 
and policies that address international de-
velopment objectives. This paper discusses 
two case studies in which non-governmental 
TA exercises have focussed on international 
development objectives in and across lower 
income countries. Both have made particular 
efforts to include broader perspectives in the 
TA process. The paper asks what we can learn 
from these networked “experiments” and ex-
plores possibilities for further institutionalisa-
tion of TA for international development.
1 Introduction
International organisations (see e.g. UN System 
Task Team 2012) often point to key roles for sci-
ence, technology and innovation (STI) in helping 
to foster sustainable and inclusive development. 
This includes moves towards a “green economy 
in the context of poverty alleviation and sus-
tainable development” discussed at the 2012 
Rio+20 conference (UNEP 2011) and to other 
international development objectives such as the 
effective implementation of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
maintaining progress towards millennium devel-
opment goals (UNDP 2011) and the formulation 
and realisation of sustainable development goals 
(OWG-SDGs 2014).
Annual global expenditure on research and 
development continues to grow beyond one tril-
